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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:

JOHN LEE HOGUE,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

CaseNo. 20041052-CA

i
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Pursuant to rule ll(i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, defendant entered guilty
pleas to possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a first degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) & (b)(i) (West 2004), and driving under
the influence, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (West 2004),
conditioned upon his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. The
case was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to this Court, which has jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)Q) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Following a valid stop, was defendant's continued detention lawful and the ensuing
search justified?
The denial of a motion to suppress is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Brake,
2004 UT 95, K 15,103 P.3d 699. Nevertheless, the trial court's underlying factual findings

must be upheld unless clearly erroneous. See id. No deference is accorded the trial court's
application of law to those facts. See id.
2. Did defense counsel's failure to object to the deputy's qualifications to testify
render counsel ineffective or result in plain error?
Defendant did not challenge the deputy's qualifications pursuant to rule 702, Utah
Rules of Evidence and a foundation objection was not reserved in the conditional plea
agreement. Therefore, the issue may not be considered for the first time on appeal. See State
v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 223 n.l (Utah App. 1995); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1271
(Utah App. 1990). See also Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(i).
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Defendant's conditional plea agreement reserved only the right to raise a Fourth
Amendment challenge on appeal (R. 121-22). The federal amendment and any other
provisions cited in argument are attached in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 20, 2002, defendant was charged with possession of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine) with intent to distribute, a second degree felony enhanced to
a first degree felony based on defendant's prior conviction and pursuant to section 58-378(l)(a)(iii) & (b)(i); possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (West 2004); and driving under the influence, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of section 41-6-44 (R. 1-2).

2

Defendant subsequently moved to suppress the drugs found in his possession (R. 3442). Defendant conceded that the initial stop was valid, but alleged that the legitimate
purpose of the stop was impermissibly expanded when he was detained and searched without
justification (id.). An evidentiary hearing was conducted (R. 45-46; R176: 1-48). At its
conclusion, the trial court orally denied the motion, but did not enter a written order (R176:
64-66). See Addendum B (Argument & Oral Ruling Denying Motion to Suppress).
On August 25, 2003, defendant entered conditional guilty pleas to two counts: first
degree felony possession with intent to distribute and class B misdemeanor driving under the
influence (R. 114-15, 116-27). Pursuant to the plea bargain, the paraphernalia charge was
dismissed and defendant was permitted to reserve the right to appeal the "issues that were
raised at the Suppression Hearing in this matter" (R. 121 -22). Sentencing was scheduled, but
defendant failed to appear (R. 136, 144). Approximately a year later, he was arrested and,
on November 23,2004, sentenced to five-years-to-life imprisonment on the felony conviction
and to concurrent six-months imprisonment on the misdemeanor conviction (R. 151-52).
Formal judgment was entered December 6, 2004 (R. 144, 155-57). On December 3, 2004,
defendant timely appealed (R. 153-54). See Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(2). The case was then
"poured over" from the supreme court to this Court (R. 182).

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS 1
On the morning of September 13, 2002, Deputy Leonard Isaacson of the Uintah
County Sheriffs Office was dispatched to investigate a vehicle burglary that had just
occurred (Rl 76: 5). The victim told the police that he saw David Sentie near the burglarized
vehicle (id.). An eyewitness saw Sentie walk away from the scene and towards defendant's
residence, where Sentie got into defendant's truck and was driven away (id.).2 Deputy
Isaacson obtained a description of the truck and the address for defendant's welding business
because the deputy had information that defendant and/or Sentie might be there (Rl 76: 5,7).
The deputy also learned that Sentie had two outstanding arrest warrants and that defendant
hadnone(R176:5, 9).
The deputy left the vehicle burglary site shortly before 11 a.m. and drove towards
defendant's business (R176: 5, 7,24). He saw defendant's truck stopped at an intersection,
waiting to turn (R176: 5). The deputy did not activate his siren or his overhead lights, but
instead drove up behind defendant's truck on the public street (R176: 5, 38).
Defendant quickly realized that a police vehicle was behind him (R176: 6, 39). He
stopped watching the on-coming traffic and began "intently watching" the deputy by staring
into the truck's rearview and side mirrors (id).
!

The facts are taken from the suppression hearing and are stated in the light most
favorable to the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. See State v. Yoder, 935
P.2d 534, 537 n.l (Utah App. 1997).
2

On this record, it is unclear if the victim or a second eyewitness observed Sentie
in defendant's truck (R176: 5, 17). In any case, defendant admitted that Sentie was in his
truck (R176: 12, 17, 24, 35, 44).
4

The deputy pointed a finger towards a parking lot immediately to the right of the
intersection, which was defendant's business parking lot (id.). Defendant acknowledged the
signal by nodding into his rearview mirror and then pulled back into his lot (R176: 6-7, 39).
The deputy followed. As the deputy passed in front of the truck, he only saw defendant in
it(R176:5,7, 12, 17, 24, 33, 44).3
The deputy walked up to the driver's window and observed signs of intoxication.
Defendant was unusually nervous:
As I approached his movements were quick, sharp, jerky. When he turned and
looked at me and was looking around, his eyes - most people don't - when
they're not nervous don't have wide open eyes looking around, a state of [sic]
a person uses in order to gather more information into their eyes when we're
nervous, excited or in fear of something in order to gather more information.
His eyes were wide open. There was no doubt he was in an excited state.
(R176: 9). The deputy described the nervousness as more than that normally exhibited "by
someone who was nervous just because the cops were there" (R176: 26, 30-32).
The deputy also observed that defendant's pupils were dilated (Rl 76:10). The deputy
found this "very uncommon" at 11 a.m. (id.). In his experience, dilated pupils were
indicative of drug usage, especially if dilated in the morning (id.).
Additionally, the deputy observed that defendant's eyes were bloodshot (R176: 1112). The deputy knew that defendant was a welder, an occupation the deputy had been
associated with for years before joining the police (R176: 6, 34, 37). He knew that welding

3

Below and on appeal, defendant classifies the stop as a consensual level-one
encounter and does not challenge its validity if limited to questions about Sentie (R. 3940; R176: 57). See also Brief of Appellant at 5, 8, 13.
5

could result in bloodshot eyes, but also knew that welding could not account for defendant's
dilated pupils and jerky nervousness (R176:28). Drug or alcohol ingestion, however, could
account the dilation and nervousness (R176: 12). The deputy suspected drugs, and not
alcohol, because no odor of alcohol emitted from defendant or the truck (id.).
Deputy Isaacson asked defendant to turn off the motor and step out of the truck
(R176: 12, 24-25). When defendant did, the deputy asked him to confirm his identity and
then questioned him about Sentie (Rl76:12,17,35,44). Defendant admitted that Sentie had
been in his truck earlier, but claimed to have dropped him off at a different location (id.).
As they spoke, the deputy observed additional signs of impairment. Defendant's
answers "were very quick to come out. They were complete sentences, but they were very
fast and short, right to the point, and his nervousness seemed to maintain the same level"
(id.). The deputy testified that this further supported his suspicion that defendant was under
the influence of drugs, specifically stimulants:
People who are nervous are quick to shoot out a short answer. Also, people
whose internal clocks are sped up are quick to blurt out what the first thing that
comes to their mind without forethought of how to deliver the information
they're trying to give.
(R176: 12-13). The deputy saw another sign of drug use:
As Mr. Hogue got out of the vehicle and started talking with me, it was almost
like the color was draining from his face. In fact, that's the commentary I used
in my report in order to verify that. It's really hard to explain other than that.
Usually when a heart - the blood pressure and that goes up, the body shuts
down the extremities or the portions of the fingers and the body. It's not
proportionate to the four [sic], five [sic], flight, food, or fornication, which is
common information received not only in the DRE [Drug Recognition Expert
Training], but other things that says when the blood pressure goes up things 6

the extremities will get cold. That's why a lot of people start pumping
themselves u p . . . . In this case Mr. Hogue lost the color in his face and started
exhibiting body tremors. It came from the mid-section in the legs. There was
none in the arms.
(R176: 13). Defendant's quick responses coupled with his facial color change were
symptoms of an elevated heart rate, which the deputy suspected was the result of either
extreme nervousness and/or drug-impairment (R176: 14).4
The deputy continued to describe the signs of impairment he observed: "There's a
tremor that comes from the mid-section, just a shakiness. To look at it, you'd think maybe
the individual was shaking because of coldness" (R176: 14). But that morning, it was not
that cold (id.). Consequently, the deputy found defendant's shaking unusual and suggestive
of impairment (Rl 76: 12-14).
The deputy decided that he would confirm or dispel his suspicions by administering
field sobriety tests (R176: 21, 45-46). The deputy first had another concern:
While I was talking with Mr. Hogue, he was standing away from me three to
five feet. I was within interview distance from him to listen to him and watch
him. But he was standing with one arm stiff and one arm limp to his side. The
funny thing about it was the way that - usually a person when they're
explaining themselves or whether they're just standing there, usually both sides
of the body would exhibit the same commentary, physical statement basically
to say. His right side was stiff and his hand was squared over his pocket about
4

At the suppression hearing (April 2003), Deputy Isaacson testified that he was a
certified drug recognition expert [DRE], but explained that at the time of the stop
(September 2002), he was not certified (R176: 10-11). He explained that at the time of
the stop, he had completed and passed all the required class training for DRE certification
and was in the process of completing twelve required supervised field evaluations (id.).
Either at the beginning or end of that month, Deputy Isaacson learned he had passed the
field portion (id.). He then submitted his paper work and was formally certified sometime
after the stop (id.).
7

an inch away from it to the side, and his other arm was just loosely to this side.
But this arm was stiff and this arm was loose. This hand was just cupped in
a normal - to the side, but this hand was spread wide open and covering the
right pocket.
(R176: 16). The deputy explained that defendant's "non-verbal statement" of holding his
right hand stiffly over his right pocket indicated that defendant was "trying to hide or
obscure" whatever was in his pocket (R176: 16-17). Moreover, the deputy could see that
something was obviously in the pocket because it bulged out about 1/4 to 2 inches (R176:
27). These observations coupled with defendant's nervousness lead the deputy to suspect
that he was concealing either a weapon or drugs in his pocket (R176: 26-27, 30-32).5
Only three to four minutes had elapsed since the initial stop (Rl 76: 17). During that
time, the deputy's initial suspicion of drug impairment—based on defendant's jerky
movements, dilated pupils, and bloodshot eyes—had become elevated, not diminished, by
defendant's other physical characteristics and his verbal responses (R176: 17, 21, 26, 31).
Only at this point, did the deputy ask about the bulges in defendant's pockets (R176:
17). The deputy asked defendant if he had a weapon or "something [the deputy] needed to
be concerned about" in his pockets (R176: 17). Defendant stated twice that there was
nothing in his pockets (R176: 18-19, 35). The deputy knew defendant's denials were false

5

Both of defendant's front pants pockets bulged, but the deputy's primary concern
was with the right pocket because it was the one being concealed and was so full that no
item(s) could be distinguished (R176: 16-18). At the suppression hearing, defendant
admitted that his pockets bulged, but claimed they were hidden from view by his shirt
(R176: 37-38). The deputy testified that whatever clothing defendant had on, it did not
prevent him from plainly seeing the bulging pockets (R176: 47).
8

because the bulging pockets were obvious (R176: 18-19). Moreover, defendant was
becoming abnormally nervous:
If I pull somebody over and they appear a little bit nervous, but their eyes
aren't dilated, they're not bloodshot. I ask them for information and they're
reaching to find it and they're fumbling around and they start explaining to me
they don't know, they haven't been stopped for so long. They go on with their
commentary saying, "I'm not sure where it's at. I do have insurance," and they
end up not finding that information like [defense counsel] was pointing out.
That is in its entirety someone who's just nervous because the cops were there,
meaning no reason other than they hadn't been stopped in awhile by their own
admission. Hadn't been stopped in awhile, here's - I'm having a tough time
finding what I'm looking for.
That's what [defense counsel] was not understanding was this - in this
case the nervousness and physical language that was coming from Mr. Hogue
was that of someone who is being deceitful, nervous because of one of several
reasons, the indicia of the dilated pupils and the other indicators of the body
that I was seeing was that of someone who had been using and did have
something to hide, especially by the right hand in its position over the pocket
about an inch away, and the left hand limply to the side.
The totality of the circumstances of each stop is based on the
information I receive verbally, physically, and in Mr. Hogue's case, it was not
someone who was fumbling around for his driver's licence in his wallet or
something to that effect.
(R176:31).
The deputy asked defendant if he would empty out his pockets so the deputy
"wouldn't have anything to worry about" (R176: 19). Defendant began emptying out his
pockets, but then fidgeted with something in his right pocket:
It appeared that as he was reaching into his pocket he was cupping something
to the back of his pocket and pushing it down as he kept going into his pocket
and pulling things out. He went into his pocket two times - two different
times. One time he pushed whatever he was covertly hiding in that pocket
towards the bottom is the way it appeared.

9

(R176: 20). The deputy could now see "two distinct little bulges" at the bottom of the right
pocket (R176: 20).

Based on the size of the bulges, the deputy no longer suspected a

weapon, but still suspected drugs (id.). The deputy asked defendant what he was hiding and
defendant asked if he was under arrest (R176: 21). The deputy said no, because he had not
completed his investigation of defendant's impairment and possible driving under the
influence (R176: 21).
The deputy warned defendant of his Miranda rights, which defendant waived (Rl 76:
22). They spoke "a little bit" and defendant admitted that he ingested methamphetamine at
10 o'clock (R176: 22, 39-40).6 The deputy asked defendant to remove the remaining item
from his pocket, which defendant did (R176: 23, 36, 45). It was a "little leather purse"
containing methamphetamine (R176: 22-23, 45).
The deputy had defendant perform four field sobriety tests: an HGN test, the onelegged stand, the nine-step walk and turn, and the Romburg test (R176: 45-46). The tests
confirmed Deputy Isaacson's suspicion that defendant had ingested a stimulant and was
"impaired to the point he was not safe to operate a motor vehicle" (R176: 46-47).
Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence and drug possession (R176:
45). The entire detention, from stop to arrest, lasted fifteen to twenty minutes (R176: 45).

6

Because the stop occurred at 11 a.m., the deputy assumed defendant meant 10
a.m. Defendant testified that he meant 10 p.m. (R. 41; R176: 39-40). Nevertheless,
defendant admitted that he "might" still have been under its influence and appeared
impaired when stopped, though he "doubted" it because he did not think he ingested that
much methamphetamine (R176: 40).
10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Fourth Amendment Challenge: Defendant does not challenge the validity of the
initial stop. He claims only that once the purpose of the initial stop was completed—that is,
once the deputy questioned him about Sentie—no further detention was warranted. He also
claims that the search of his pocket was illegal. Defendant's arguments are without merit.
Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifies a detention. Here, the deputy
originally stopped defendant to question him about Sentie, but once stopped, the deputy
immediately and reasonably suspected that defendant was impaired. To confirm or dispel
these suspicions, the deputy ordered him to exit the truck, observed additional signs of
impairment, and ultimately administered field sobriety tests to defendant. When defendant
failed those tests, he was arrested for driving under the influence. Based on the totality of
the circumstances, the trial court correctly concluded that reasonable suspicion supported
defendant's continued detention and probable cause supported his arrest.
In investigating defendant's impairment, the deputy observed defendant attempting
to conceal his bulging right pocket. Defendant twice falsely denied that anything was in the
pocket. Suspecting that defendant was concealing a weapon or drugs, the deputy instructed
him to empty it. The trial court correctly found that the deputy's observations coupled with
defendant's false statements justified the search.
Alternatively, the search may be upheld on any ground apparent in the record. Here,
the search took place prior to, but contemporaneous with, defendant's valid arrest for driving
under the influence. Consequently, it is justifiable as a search incident to arrest. For much
11

the same reason, the discovery of the drugs was also inevitable. The record establishes that
independent of the search, the deputy intended to administer field sobriety tests. Once those
tests were given, the predictable outcome was arrest for driving under the influence. And
once arrested, the search of defendant's person and the discovery of the drugs were
inevitable.
Rule 702 Objection: Defendant claims for the first time on appeal that his trial counsel
was ineffective for not objecting to the deputy's suppression hearing testimony. According
to defendant, the deputy should not have been allowed to describe defendant's drug
impairment because he did not qualify as an expert under rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence.
He also claims that the trial court plainly erred in permitting the testimony.
Defendant's claim should be summarily rejected because it is not properly before the
Court. A defendant cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal from a conditional
guilty plea. Instead, the only issues which may be raised are those expressly reserved in the
conditional plea agreement with the consent of the prosecutor and the approval of the trial
court. Here, the plea agreement reserved only the right to appeal the denial of defendant's
Fourth Amendment claim.
Even if the rule 702 issue was legitimately raised on appeal, it has no merit. The rules
of evidence do not apply to suppression hearings. Moreover, even if the rules did apply, the
deputy qualified as an expert. Furthermore, specialized knowledge was not required to
testify to many of the signs of impairment that the deputy observed. Because defendant

12

cannot establish error in the admission of the deputy's testimony, his ineffective assistance
of counsel and plain error claims necessarily fail.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S CONTINUED DETENTION WAS LAWFUL AND HIS
SEARCH WAS JUSTIFIED; THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT
CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
This appeal is from conditional guilty pleas (R121-22). The issues on appeal are
limited to those reserved in the plea agreement, that is, to the issues "raised at the
Suppression Hearing in this matter" (id.). See Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(i) {Addendum A). See
also Point II, infra. The issues that were raised in the suppression hearing are: (1) whether
following the valid initial stop, defendant's continued detention was lawful; and (2) whether
the ensuing search of defendant's pocket was justified (R. 34-42; R176: 57-64). The trial
court found both the detention and search permissible and denied defendant's motion to
suppress (R176: 64-66). See Addendum B (Argument & Oral Ruling). The trial court's
ruling is correct.
B elow and on appeal, defendant acknowledges that he voluntarily pulled back into his
own business lot and characterizes the initial encounter as a level one consensual encounter
(R. 39-40; R176: 57). See Brief ofAppellant [Br.Apll] at 5, 8,13. Such encounters do not
implicate the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1987)
(recognizing that "an officer may approach a citizen at anytime and pose questions so long
as the citizen is not detained against his will" and classifying such encounters as level one
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consensual encounters that require no particularized suspicion); Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921
P.2d 1003, 1005 (Utah App.) (holding that a police request to a suspect to walk outside a
nightclub and speak to officers was a consensual encounter), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963
(Utah 1996).
The trial court commented that when the deputy signaled with his finger for defendant
to pull into the parking lot, a level-two stop may have ensued (R176: 64-65). Defendant,
however, does not dispute that Deputy Isaacson was legitimately investigating a vehicle
burglary or that he had reason to believe that defendant drove the suspect, David Sentie,
away from the scene in defendant's truck. See Br.Aplt. at 5,8,13. He concedes that the facts
justified a stop to question defendant about his involvement with Sentie and to determine
Sentie's whereabouts. See id. See Deitman, 739 P.2d at 618 (recognizing that police are
justified in questioning individuals seen in the area of a burglary alarm); United States v.
Brown, 334 F.3d 1161, 1166-67, (D.C. Cir. 2003) (recognizing that police are justified in
questioning individuals who "either observed or [were] involved" in a recent crime), cert,
denied, 541 U.S. 954 (2004). Therefore, this Court need not determine the level of the initial
encounter because its validity is not contested.
Defendant argues that once defendant had been questioned about Sentie, there was no
legitimate basis to further detain or search him. See Br.Aplt. at 5-15. Defendant's argument
ignores the facts of this case.7
7

Defendant also argues that even though it was permissible to question him at the
window of the truck, he should not have been asked to exit the truck for that questioning.
See Br.Aplt. at 8-9 & 13. Defendant is incorrect. It is well-established that the occupants
14

As the trial court correctly concluded, as soon as the deputy lawfully approached
defendant's truck, he observed that defendant was impaired, which justified defendant's
continued detention beyond the purpose of the burglary questioning (R176: 64-66). See
Subsection B, infra. That legitimate period of continued detention to investigate defendant's
impairment quickly elevated to probable cause for his arrest for driving under the influence
(id.). The court also correctly concluded that the search (emptying of defendant's pocket)
was justified based on the deputy's observations of defendant and defendant's false answers
(R176: 65). See Subsection C, infra.
Alternatively, the search may be upheld on any ground apparent in the record. See
State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 356 (Utah 1996). Here, defendant's arrest for driving under
the influence was valid. Consequently, the search of defendant's pocket, which proceeded,
but was contemporaneous with that arrest, constituted a valid search incident to arrest. For
much the same reason, the discovery of the drugs in defendant's pocket was also inevitable.
Independent of the search, the deputy intended to administer field sobriety tests. The results
of those tests destined defendant's arrest, which in turn rendered the discovery of the drugs
incident to that arrest inevitable. See Subsection C, infra.
Under any of these theories, the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress
should be affirmed. This Court need not reach the merits, however, because defendant has
failed to properly marshal the facts.
of a lawfully stopped vehicle may be ordered to exit it. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519
U.S. 408, 414 (1997) (passenger); Pennsylvania v. Minims, 434 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1977)
(driver).
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A.

Defendant's Failure to Marshal the Facts Precludes Consideration
of His Claims on Appeal

"The legal analysis of search and seizure cases is highly fact dependent." State v.
Brake, 2004 UT 95, t 2, 103 P.2d 699. The trial court's factual findings are accordingly
entitled to deference on appeal and upheld unless clearly erroneous. Id. at f 15. The trial
court's application of law to those facts is accorded no deference and reviewed for
correctness. Id. See also State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ^ 20-23.
Give the fact-dependent nature of the inquiry, defendant is obligated to marshal the
facts in support of the trial court's factual findings and ultimate legal ruling before he may
attack either. See United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds,
2006 UT 35,ffll24-26, 140 P.3d 1200; Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, \ 16, 100 P.3d 1177.
Marshaling requires a defendant to "present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every
scrap of competent evidence introduced [at the hearing] to support the very findings [he]
resists." Chen, 2004 UT 82, \ 11 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). He "must
correlate all particular items of evidence with the challenged findings and then convince [the
appellate court] that the trial court erred in the assessment of that evidence to its findings."
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In essence, a defendant must become
a "devil's advocate" by "temporarily removing] [his] own prejudices and fully embracing]
the adversary's position." Id. Only in this manner can a defendant establish the "fatal flaw"
in the trial court's reasoning justifying reversal of its decision. See id. at ^f 78-79.
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Here, defendant has failed to meet this obligation. Consequently, his claims on appeal
maybe summarily rejected. See United Park City Mines Co., 2006 UT 35, \ 27; Chen, 2004
UT 82, If 80..
Comparison of defendant's summary of the deputy's testimony with the State's
summary quickly establishes defendant's marshaling failures. Compare BrAplt. at 4, with
State's Statement of Facts, supra, at 4-10. In a single paragraph, defendant purports to
summarize Deputy Isaacson's extensive and detailed testimony. See BrAplt. at 4. The
summary wholly fails to marshal the facts. For example, defendant states that the deputy
only "noted that Mr. Hogue appeared nervous," but "did not testify to any lack of balance,
erratic movements or anything of the sort" to suggest that defendant was impaired. See
BrAplt. at 4. This does not marshal the deputy's testimony, which abounds with detailed
observations of defendant's drug impairment. See supra, at 4-10. Similarly, defendant
claims that he was searched only because he was nervous. SeeBrAplt. at4. Again, this does
not marshal the facts. The deputy testified that when he directed defendant to empty his
pockets, he believed that the bulging pocket contained a weapon or drugs based on the size
of the bulge, defendant's attempts to conceal his right pocket, and his false denials that
anything was in either pocket. See supra, at 7-8.
Defendant also improperly states that Deputy Isaacson "testified that he was not
trained as a Drug Recognition Expert." See BrAplt. at 15. See also BrAplt. at 17-18
(repeating that the deputy had no training in drug recognition and "had not passed the [DRE]
course"). This does not marshal the facts. At the suppression hearing, Deputy Isaacson
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testified that he was a certified drug recognition expert (R176: 10-11). He explained that at
the time of the stop, he was not certified (id.). He had completed and passed all required
classroom drug recognition training and was in the process of completing twelve supervised
field evaluations (id.). Either shortly before or shortly after the stop, he was notified that he
had passed and, after the stop, was certified (id.). See supra, at 7 n.4. Additionally, as the
trial court noted, the deputy was otherwise experienced and several of the physical
characteristics he observed were commonly recognized symptoms of drug use (R176: 65).
Moreover, to the extent defendant acknowledges facts, he impermissibly parses them
to minimize their significance. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)
(directing that in determining reasonable suspicion, the facts must not be viewed in isolation,
but judged in their totality). Again, this does not met the marshaling standard. See United
Park City Mines Co., 2006 UT 35, \ 26 (reaffirming that marshaling obligation is not met
by "merely re-argu[ing[ the factual case presented to the trial court") (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). For example, defendant claims that Deputy Isaacson never
suspected that defendant was armed. See Br.Aplt. at 7 (citing R176: 21). In contrast, when
marshaled, the facts establish that the deputy was concerned that defendant was concealing
a weapon in his bulging pocket and only discounted this concern after the pocket was
emptied of everything but the small purse (R176: 16-17, 20, 26-27, 30-32). Similarly,
defendant asserts that the deputy's testimony was conflicting and not credible. See Br.Aplt.
at 15. Defendant alleges that the deputy inconsistently denied knowing defendant and yet
claimed to have recognized his truck. See id. (citing R176: 5 & 9). If marshaled, the facts
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establish no inconsistency. The deputy testified that he did not know defendant (R176: 9).
But in investigating the vehicle burglary, the deputy obtained a description of defendant's
truck, which enabled him to recognize it when he saw it at the street intersection in front of
defendant's business (R176: 5,28). Defendant also asserts that the deputy was not credible
concerning what clothing defendant wore and whether a weapon was ever found. See
Br.Aplt. at 15 (citing R176: 21, 26, 33). Neither assertion is supported by the marshaled
facts. The deputy stated only that he did not recall finding a weapon and none was listed in
his report (R176: 33). The deputy also stated that he did not particularly remember
defendant's clothing because, contrary to defendant's assertion, no clothing restricted the
deputy's view of defendant's pockets (R176: 16-19, 27).
In sum, defendant's failures to marshal the suppression hearing testimony that
supports the trial court's factual findings and ruling justifies summary affirmance of
defendant's convictions. See United Park City Mines Co., 2006 UT 35, Tf 27; Chen, 2004
UT 82, ^f 80. Even if defendant's claims are considered, they are without merit.
B.

The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that the Deputy's
Observations of Defendant Supported His Continued
Detention.

Defendant claims that no reasonable suspicion existed to support his further detention
once he responded to the questions about Sentie.8 See Br.Aplt. at 8-14. The argument
8

Defendant erroneously asserts that his continued detention was a "level two or
three detention." See Br.Aplt. at 9. Defendant is incorrect. A level three detention only
occurred when defendant was arrested for driving under the influence after failing the
field sobriety tests (R176: 46). See Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617-618 (classifying an arrest
as a level three seizure requiring probable cause).
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ignores the facts. When the totality of the facts are considered, they amply support a
reasonable suspicion that defendant was impaired while driving and justify his continued
detention. See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1132 (Utah 1994) (reaffirming that continued
investigatory detention must be supported by reasonable suspicion, based on specific and
articulable facts, that criminal activity is afoot). See alsoArvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 (requiring
that facts supporting reasonable suspicion must be viewed in their totality and not in
isolation).
The facts establish that before defendant was ordered out of his truck and questioned
about Sentie, Deputy Isaacson observed defendant's dilated pupils, his bloodshot eyes, and
his jerky overly nervous movements. See supra, at 5-6. Based on his training and
experience, the deputy suspected that defendant was impaired. See id. Indeed, as the trial
court correctly noted, the condition of defendant's eyes alone supported a reasonable
suspicion that he was driving while impaired (Rl 76:65). See State v. Hechtle, 2004 UT App
96, \ 13, 89 P.3d 185 (recognizing that a driver's "red, droopy, and watery" eyes and dilated
pupils support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity). See also State v. Santacruz, 133
P.3d 484, 486 (Wash. App. 2006) (holding that driver's dilated eyes created a "specific,
articulable reason to inquire further").
Once defendant was out of the truck, the deputy discounted alcohol as the source of
the impairment because there was no smell of alcohol on defendant or emitting from the
truck (R176: 12). The deputy also reasonably discounted defendant's welding work as the
source of the combined physical traits he observed (R176: 28). And though the deputy was
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not required to eliminate these innocent explanations for defendant's physical condition, the
fact that he considered, but then reasonably discounted them, served only to heighten his
suspicions. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277 (holding that a "determination that reasonable
suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct"); State v.
Markland, 2005 UT 26, f 17, 112 P.3d 507 (same).
During his questioning of Sentie, the deputy observed additional signs of impairment.
See supra, at 6-7. These additional signs (quick accelerated answers, body tremors, and the
color draining from defendant's face) not only confirmed, but elevated the deputy's initial
suspicion of impairment. Accordingly, the deputy decided to administer field sobriety tests.
See supra, at 7. See also Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (recognizing that during a level two
detention, the officer "must diligently pursue a means of investigation that is likely to
confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
When defendant failed those tests, probable cause existed for his arrest for driving under the
influence.
In sum, as the trial court correctly found and concluded, there was ample justification
to support defendant's continued detention and ultimate arrest (R176: 64-66) {Add. B). Cf.
Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96, ^ 12-17 (recognizing that reasonable suspicion supported
Hechtle's continued detention, but concluding that probable cause did not exist to arrest him
for driving with any measurable controlled substance in his body where there was no
evidence of recent drug use and officer did not administer field sobriety tests to confirm his
suspicions).
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In attacking the trial court's ruling, defendant impermissibly parses the supporting
facts to minimize their significance. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 (requiring facts to be
judged in their totality). For example, defendant asserts that the deputy detained him only
because he was nervous and then argues that nervousness alone cannot establish reasonable
suspicion. See Br.Aplt. at 4-15. However, the deputy did not detain defendant merely
because he was nervous, but because of numerous physical signs of impairment, only one of
which was defendant's jerky nervous movements. See supra, at 4-10 (describing in detail
defendant's nervousness, "wide-open" blood shot eyes, dilated pupils, and body tremors).
Additionally, defendant's nervousness increased during the encounter, especially when asked
about the bulge in his pocket (Rl 76:18). The deputy compared defendant's reaction to other
individuals he stopped and, by comparison, concluded that defendant's increased
nervousness was abnormal (R176: 26,30-32). SeeArvizu, 534 U.S. at 275-76 (recognizing
that an officer's assessment of "odd" behavior compared to other encounters may be
considered in determining reasonable suspicion). And when asked about what was in his
pockets, defendant gave observable false answers (R176: 18-19, 35). Based on the totality
of these facts, the deputy reasonably suspected that defendant had ingested drugs and had a
weapon or drugs in his pocket. See Markland, 2005 UT 26, f 21 (recognizing that unusual
behavior and answers "inconsistent with observable facts" supported reasonable suspicion
to continue detention); State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah App. 1990) (recognizing
that efforts at concealment and false answers supported continued detention).
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Moreover, though defendant argues that the trial court should not have believed the
deputy, see Br.Aplt. at 15, defendant never denied the deputy's observations. To the
contrary, defendant testified that he ingested methamphetamine before being stopped, albeit
he claimed the night before (R176: 39-40). See supra, at 10 n.6. And while he did not "see
how [he had] done enough" drugs to still be under their influence in the morning, he admitted
that it was possible that he was impaired when stopped (R176: 40). Thus, the facts
evidencing defendant's impairment—and supporting reasonable suspicion—were not
significantly challenged at the suppression hearing.
In sum, the trial court properly considered the totality of the facts, properly credited
the deputy's testimony, and correctly ruled that reasonable suspicion supported defendant's
continued detention.
C.

The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that the Search of Defendant ys
Pocket Was Permissible.

The trial court correctly concluded that the search was justified based on the deputy's
observations and defendant's false answers that nothing was in his pockets (R176: 65-66).
The court's ruling is admittedly minimal:
Then, as [defense counsel] said, we get to the search. The search, I guess as
a result of Deputy Isaacson asking him what was in his pockets, there was
visibly something in his pocket. He said it extended in a bulge and that he was
concerned. The defendant answered nothing twice when asked if there was what was in his pockets. They gave him Miranda. He was asked to empty his
pockets, and out came the dope.
I think his actions are reasonable here . . . I'm going to deny your
motion to suppress.
(id.) {Add. B).
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Defendant's challenge to the trial court's ruling is two-fold. See Br.Aplt. at 7-8. He
claims that the search cannot be justified as a Terry frisk. See Br.Aplt. at 7. He also claims
that probable cause did not support the search. See Br.Aplt. at 8.
Defendant is correct that the search does not constitute a Terry frisk, which is
confined to a pat down of a suspect's outer clothing. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-23
(1968) (permitting a patting of a suspect's outside clothing when an officer reasonably
believes the suspect may be armed and dangerous). See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-16
(West 2004) (permitting a "frisk" of a detainee based on a reasonable suspicion that he is
armed). Here, no frisk occurred (R176: 45). Instead, defendant was asked to empty his
pockets (R176: 19).

The search is supported by probable cause.9

Three facts combine to create probable cause to search. First, defendant's physical
characteristics supported a reasonable suspicion that he had recently ingested drugs. See
discussion, supra. Second, the size of the bulge in his right pocket and defendant's attempts
to conceal it suggested that the pocket contained a weapon or drugs (R176: 16, 19). And

9

To be lawful, a warrantless search must be supported by probable cause and an
exception to the warrant requirement, typically exigent circumstances, must apply. See
State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah App. 1997) (defining exigent circumstances
justifying a warrantless search as those circumstances "that could cause a reasonable
person to believe that [an immediate search] was necessary to prevent physical harm to
the officer[,] . . . the destruction of relevant evidence, [or] the escape of the suspect")
(citation and internal question marks omitted). Here, defendant only attacks the probable
cause to search and does not claim that exigent circumstances did not exist. See Br.Aplt.
at 5-15.
Moreover, as will be discussed, infra, the warrantless search is justified under two
additional exceptions—the search incident to arrest exception and the inevitable
discovery doctrine.
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third, defendant lied when he claimed nothing was in either of his pockets (R176: 18-19).
See State v. Griffith, 2006 UT App 291, \ 8, 141 P.3d 602 (holding that a suspect's
"implausible answer/' nervous behavior, and attempt to conceal objects associated with drug
usage supported probable cause to search the suspect's vehicle) Menke, 787 P.2d at 542-43
(holding that Menke's obviously false responses to what was in a grocery bag coupled with
a reasonable suspicion that he had shoplifted "tip the scales" and supported probable cause
to search the bag). Accord Yoder, 935 P.2d at 541-42 (holding that Yoder's false answers
coupled with his "nervous and suspicious behavior" when questioned by the police
established probable cause to search his apartment); State v. Nguyen, 878 P.2d 1183,118788 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that false answers coupled with nervous behavior and
reasonable suspicion of theft justified search of automobile). See also State v. Velenzuela,
589 P.2d 1306,1306-1307 (Ariz. 1979) (holding that probable cause to reach into suspect's
bulging pocket existed based on a reasonable suspicion of recent drug use coupled with
suspect's denial that anything was in his bulging pocket).
Alternatively, the search may be upheld on any ground apparent in the record. See
South, 924 P.2d at 356. Here, the search may easily be upheld as either a search incident to
defendant's valid arrest for driving under the influence or pursuant to the inevitable
discovery doctrine.
Normally, a search incident to arrest follows the arrest. See Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752,762-63 (recognizing that when an arrest is made, "it is reasonable for the arresting
officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might
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seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape . . . [and] to search for and seize any
evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction"). But
a search which precedes an arrest may also be justified as "incident to arrest" if the two occur
contemporaneously and probable cause supports the arrest independent of the search. See
State v. Chansamone, 2003 UT App 107, f 11, 69 P.3d 293. Here, these conditions are met.
The deputy observed all the physical signs of impairment before the search occurred.
See supra, at 4-8. He then initiated the search of defendant's pockets before administering
the field sobriety tests to reassure himself that defendant had nothing in them to be
"concerned about" (R176: 17,21,45-46). After finding the drugs, the deputy completed the
investigation into defendant's impairment by administering the field tests and, when
defendant failed them, validly arrested defendant. See supra, at 7 & 10. Only ten minutes
elapsed between the search and arrest (R176: 45). See Brown, 334 F.3d at 1167 (cautioning
appellate courts not to "second guess a street officer's assessment about the order in which
he should secure potential threats or investigate his suspicions") (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Based on these facts, the search was contemporaneous with defendant's arrest for
driving under the influence, which arrest was supported by probable cause independent of
the search. See State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220,226-28 (Utah App. 1995) (holding that prearrest search and seizure of drugs was justified as incident to arrest where probable cause to
arrest—smell of marijuana coupled with false answers—existed independent of the
discovered drugs).
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For much the same reason, the discovery of the drugs was also inevitable. See State
v. James, 2000 UT 80, ffl[ 14-16 (clarifying that pursuant to the "inevitable discovery"
doctrine, illegally discovered evidence maybe admissible if "'the prosecution can establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately would have been
discovered by lawful means,") (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,444 (1984)). Here,
this requires a showing that, absent the intervening search, the drugs would still have been
necessarily and lawfully discovered. See State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 225, 242 (Ore. 1985)
(recognizing that evidence is inevitably discovered when the prosecution shows that "absent
the illegality," the same evidence would have been discovered "by proper and predictable
police investigative procedures"), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 141. See also State v. Northrup,
756 P.2d 1288, 1293-95 (Utah App. 1988); State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 923 n.8 (Utah
App. 1995). Again, the record facts support this.
As just discussed, Deputy Isaacson made the decision to administer field sobriety tests
based on the signs of impairment he had observed. Thus, independent of the search, the field
tests would have been administered. And if administered, defendant would have failed the
tests. And once failed, probable cause existed for his arrest. Once arrested for driving under
the influence, the search of his person and discovery of the drugs were inevitable in a search
incident to arrest. See United States v. Larsen, 111 F.3d 984, 987 (10th Cir. 1997)
(recognizing that "[e]xclusion of physical evidence that would inevitably have been
discovered adds nothing to either the integrity or fairness of a criminal trial
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Fairness can

be assured by placing the State and the accused in the same positions they would have been
in had the impermissible conduct not taken place"), cert, denied, 118 S. Ct. 1105 (1998).
* * *

For these reasons, the trial court correctly concluded that defendant's continued
detention was lawful and the search permissible. This Court should affirm that decision.
POINT II
DEFENDANT CANNOT RAISE A RULE 702 OBJECTION FOR THE
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL FROM CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEAS;
EVEN IF THE ISSUE WAS PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT, IT
HAS NO MERIT
For the first time on appeal, defendant challenges Deputy Isaacson's ability to
recognize the signs of drug impairment. See Br.Aplt. at 15-21. According to defendant, the
deputy was not "trained or certified" as a drug recognition expert [DRE] and, therefore, not
qualified to testify that bloodshot eyes, dilated pupils, jerky nervousness, facial color
changes, body tremors, and speeded-up responses were signs of drug impairment. See
Br.Aplt. at 18. Defendant argues that admission of that testimony violated rule 702, Utah
Rules of Evidence, the expert witness rule. See Br.Aplt. at 15-21 . See also Add. A. (rule).
Defendant concedes that he raised no rule 702 objection below. See Br.Aplt. at 15.
Nor did the conditional plea agreement reserve the right to raise a rule 702 challenge (R. 121 22). Nevertheless, defendant presumes that the issue may be considered for the first time on
appeal because he raises it via ineffective assistance of counsel and plain error. See Br.Aplt.
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at 15-21. In doing so, defendant fails to recognize the limited nature of his right to appeal
from his conditional guilty pleas.
As will be more fully discussed, defendant cannot raise a new issue in an appeal from
a conditional guilty plea. Instead, he may only raise issues agreed to by the prosecutor and
approved by the trial court in the conditional plea agreement.
Alternatively, even if a rule 702 issue was properly before this Court, it has no merit.
Except for privileges, a trial court is not bound by the rules of evidence in a suppression
hearing. And even if the rules applied to such proceedings, Deputy Isaacson was a certified
DRE when he testified at the suppression hearing. Moreover, his lack of certification at the
time of the stop did not prevent him from testifying to signs of impairment that he was
trained and experienced in recognizing. Because no error occurred, defendant's ineffective
assistance of counsel and plain error claims fail.
A.

A Defendant May Not Raise an Issue For the First Time in an Appeal
From a Conditional Guilty Plea.

"A voluntary guilty plea is a waiver of the right to appeal all nonjurisdictional issues,
including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations." See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938
(Utah App. 1988). AccordSpurgeon, 904 P.2d at 223 n.l. A defendant who enters a guilty
plea does not merely waive consideration of the merits of a pre-plea issue, the plea waives
the waives his right to even file an appeal.
Only one exception exists to the guilty plea-waiver rule. If the prosecutor agrees and
the trial court approves, a defendant may enter a guilty plea conditioned upon his right to
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appeal a specified adverse pretrial ruling. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (i) (Add. A). Accord
Sery, 758 P.2d at 939; State v. Boboy 803 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Utah App. 1990). Thus, before
the merits of an issue may be considered in an appeal from a conditional guilty plea, the
defendant must "conclusively" establish that (1) he raised an issue in the trial court that was
decided adversely to him, (2) he reached an agreement with the prosecutor that he could
reserve the right to appeal the adverse ruling if he pled guilty, and (3) the trial court approved
the conditional plea agreement reached by the parties. See State v. Norris, 2002 UT App
305, \ 3 & n.3, 57 P.3d 238; Bobo, 803 P.2d at 1271. Moreover, the terms of a conditional
plea agreement must be strictly construed. See Norris, 2002 UT App. 305, f 3 & n.3. As
this Court has commented, an appeal from a conditional guilty plea is "not defendants*
chance to have their cases tried by the appellate court." Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 233 n.l.
In this case, the parties agreed only that defendant could appeal the "issues that were
raised at the Suppression Hearing in this matter" (R. 121-22). The only issues raised at that
hearing were the Fourth Amendment claims discussed in Point I of this brief (R. 34-42;
R176: 49-66) (Add. B). Defendant concedes that the issues raised in the suppression hearing
did not include a rule 702-based objection to the deputy's qualifications to testify. See
Br.Aplt. at 15. Consequently, defendant is prohibited from raising the issue now.
Claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and plain error does not change this. Rule
1 l(i) creates a contractual right to appeal where no constitutional or statutory right to appeal
exists. See cases cited, supra. But ineffective assistance and plain error claims do not effect
a defendant's right to appeal. They are merely procedural default exceptions, which permit
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an appellate court to "balance the need for procedural regularity with the demands of
fairness." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 13, 10 P.3d 346. If these procedural default
exceptions are applied in appeals from conditional guilty pleas, they would unilaterally
change the contractual terms of the underlying conditional plea agreement and violate the
plain mandates of rule 1 l(i).
In sum, this Court should not create an exception to rule 1 l(i)'s exception.
B.

Alternatively, Defendant Cannot Establish Actual Error and His
Ineffective Counsel and Plain Error Claims Fail

Even if a rule 702 challenge was properly raised on appeal, the challenge has no merit.
Without proof of error, defendant's claims of ineffective assistance and plain error fail.10
To prevail on appeal, defendant must establish that his trial counsel's failure to raise
a rule 702 objection was deficient as a matter of law and that the deficiency prejudiced the
outcome of the suppression hearing. Cf State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, \ 6, 89 P.3d 162; State
v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,119, 12 P.3d 92 (both setting out test for ineffective assistance
of counsel at trial). Likewise, to establish plain error, defendant must establish that actual
error occurred, the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and that the error

10

In State v. Dunkel, 2006 UT App 339,ffif8-10, 558 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, the State
raised, but the Court did not address, the same argument concerning ineffectiveness and
plain error claims raised in an appeal from a conditional plea. Instead, the Court
summarily disposed of the merits of Dunkel's underlying claim: "[E]ven assuming that
Dunkel may now properly raise this issue through a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel or plain error, his argument is without merit." Id. at *| 8. This approach, while
easy, encourages circumvention of rule 1 l(i)'s strict dictates. The State addresses the
merits of defendant's argument only in the interest of complete briefing, but maintains the
merits should not be considered.
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prejudiced the outcome of the suppression hearing. Cf State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT
29, \ 16, 94 P.3d 186 (setting out plain error test in context of trial). Here, there was no actual
error.
A trial court is not bound by the rules of evidence, including rule 702!s foundational
requirements, in conducting a suppression hearing and ruling on the admissibility of
evidence. See State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1987), cert denied, 485 U.S.
1036 (1988); State v. Clifford, 1999 UT App 112 (unpublished opinion) {Addendum Q . See
also Utah R. Evid. 104(a) (stating that a court is "not bound by the rules of evidence except
those with respect to privileges" in ruling on "[preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness . . . or the admissibility of evidence"); Utah R. Evid.
1101 (b) (stating that the rules of evidence are inapplicable to "[preliminary questions of fact
which are to be determined under Rule 104(a)" and to "[miscellaneous proceedings for . .
. issuance of. . . search warrants") {Add. A). Because the trial court was not bound by rule
702 in conducting the suppression hearing, it could not have committed plain error for not
complying with it. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208-09 (Utah 1993). Nor could trial
counsel be ineffective for failing to raise a futile objection. See State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41,
| 2 6 , lP.3d546.
Moreover, even if the evidentiary rules applied to suppression hearings, there was no
error here. Defendant implicitly concedes that if Deputy Isaacson was trained or certified as
a DRE, he was qualified to testify as an expert pursuant to rule 702. See Br.Aplt. at 15-17.
But contrary to defendant's assertions, see Br.Aplt, at 15, defendant was a certified DRE
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when he testified (R176: 10). He was also trained as a DRE, though not certified, at the time
of the stop (R176: 10-11) and had experience with drug users (R176: 65). Rule 702 accepts
professional certification, training, experience, or any combination of these as proper
qualifications to testify as an expert. See Utah R. Evid. 702 (stating that a witness may
qualify as an expert based on his "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education").
Moreover, as the trial court noted, many of the signs of impairment defendant observed did
not require the specialized knowledge of an expert, but were common knowledge in today's
drug-infused culture:
Setting aside the nervousness, setting aside the bloodshot eyes, if you've got
pupils that look like hoot owls at 11 o'clock in the morning, you've got some
signals that there may be impairment.
Officer Isaacson testified he hadn't completed the drug recognition
certification, but that he's probably made a lot of arrests of impaired drivers,
and we deal with methamphetamine use in the community, and it isn't hard to
spot. There are signs and things that are obvious to even people on the street
that are indicative that somebody is high on meth.
(R176: 65) (Add. B). See State v. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, f 34 (recognizing that
testimony that "an average bystander would be able to providers not expert testimony).
In sum, defendant's foundational challenge should not be considered for the first time
on appeal. Even if it is, the failure to raise a rule 702 objection below did not result in either
ineffective assistance of counsel or plain error.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the Court affirm
defendant's convictions.
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ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
This State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the
appellate court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals,
2005 UT 18, If 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the
litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 65 A P.2d 740, 743
(Cal. 1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral
argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a).
Respectfully submitted this oTf day of September, 2006.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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Christine F. Soltis
Assistant Attorney General
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Addenda

Addendum A

Addendum A

Amendment IV. Search and seizure
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

R U L E 1 1 . PLEAS
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had 'a
reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not
guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or,
if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may
be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility
of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion
to withdraw the plea; and

(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the
contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English
language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to
the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make
a motion under Section 77-13-6*
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved or
rejected by the court.
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence
is not binding on the court.
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, u p o n
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and
the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may
then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the
proposed disposition will be approved.
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and
then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no
contest, reserving in the record the right, e n appeal from the judgment, to a
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.
(k) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record
as a whole. Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does
not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this
rule is not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea.
[Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; November 1,
2001; November 1, 2002; April 1, 2005; November 1, 2005 ]

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

RULE 104. PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS
(a) Questions of Admissibility Generally. Preliminary questions concerning
the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the
provisions of Subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by
the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
(b) Relevancy Conditioned on Fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon,
or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the
fulfillment of the condition.
(c) Hearing of Jury. Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all
cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be so conducted when the interests of justice require, or
when an accused is a witness and so requests.
(d) Testimony by Accused. The accused does not, by testifying upon a
preliminary matter, become subject to cross-examination as to other issues in
the case.
(e) Weight and Credibility. This rule does not limit the right of a party to
introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility.
[Amended effective October 1, 1992.]

RULE 7 0 2 . TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

R U L E 1 1 0 1 . APPLICABILITY OF RULES
(a) Courts and Magistrates. These rules apply to all actions and proceedings
in the courts of this state except as otherwise provided in Subdivisions (b) and
(c).
(b) Rules Inapplicable. The rules (other than with respect to privileges) do
not apply in the following situations:
(1) Preliminary questions of fact which are to be determined under Rule
104(a);
(2) Grand jury proceedings;
(3) Miscellaneous proceedings for extradition, sentencing or granting or
revocation of probation, issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal summonses
and search warrants and proceedings with respect to release on bail or
otherwise;
(4) Contempt proceedings in which the court may act summarily.
(c) In a criminal preliminary examination, reliable hearsay shall be admissible as provided under Rule 1102.
[Amended effective January 1, 1995; April 1, 1999.]
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MR. THOMAS:

Nothing further.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. BEASLIN:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. THOMAS:

Okay.
Nothing further, your Honor.
You go first.
At this point, as the Court is aware,

6

I've —

7

that I wanted to have this hearing first so we could get the

8

facts down.

9

prepared to argue it orally, or if the Court would prefer, I can

10

in my response to Mr. Beaslin's memorandum, I indicated

There are two ways that we can go about it.

I am

submit a memorandum.

11

THE COURT:

I will really let you decide that,

12

Mr. Thomas.

13

rule on it, or you can argue it here today.

14

If you want to do a memorandum and submit it, I can

MR. THOMAS:

15

Maybe for purposes of efficiency, I'll go

ahead and make the argument today, if that's okay.

16

THE COURT:

All right.

17

MR. THOMAS:

Your Honor, in this particular matter,

18

Mr. Beaslin has raised a couple issues.

The first issue that he

19

raises is in relation to the search of the pocket, and he uses as

20

a basis for his —

21

familiar with, and that is the State of Utah vs. LaFonze

22

(phonetic), which is a Utah Court of Appeals case that is an

his argument a new case the Court may be

23 I April case, so it's real recent.
24 I

For purposes of argument, the State is willing to

25 I indicate that that case has factual similarities to this case,
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and I'm willing to accept that for —

2

case is actually cert is being sought, so I'm not exactly sure

3

what the final outcome of that case is, but the State does

4

acknowledge that it currently is the law in the State of Utah.

5

note I do believe that that

With that, let me just refer specific to some aspects of

6

LaFonze and make the factual distinctions.

7

knows that any time you have a search issue, particularly when

8

there's a search done or a seizure done outside of a warrant,

9

it's a factually intensive examination, and the Court has to

10

carefully examine each fact.

11

the circumstances.

12

As the Court well

The test is in fact the totality of

When looking at the LaFonze case, and I don't believe

13

the Court has that in front of you, but if you would note

14

specifically in paragraph 23 of that case, one of the factual

15

distinctions that I want to draw in this one is in LaFonze —

16

Mr. Beaslin set that forth in his memorandum quite a bit.

17
18
19

and

In the LaFonze case, this is a situation where they made
a stop -- an officer made a stop, a n d —
THE COURT:

20

three miles an hour.

21

MR. THOMAS:

It was a legal stop because the car was

That is correct.

It was a legal stop.

22

addition to that, they had the license plate issue.

But

23

nonetheless, it was a legal stop.

24

analysis, they indicated it was a legal stop, and they also

25

indicated that based on the conduct of the individual in the

As you move through that

In

-511

vehicle moving things around, and specifically stuffing things

2

between their legs and then other indications, and in fact the

3

officer had the authority to expand the scope of that stop.

4

think factually in this case the Court similarly has the ability

5

to expand the scope of the stop, and the officer was in fact

6

justified in asking specific questions based on the totality of

7

the circumstances and what they observed.

8
9

I

But I want to move beyond that, because as in LaFonze,
we have here where an officer actually was curious about items in

10

the pocket.

11

ruling starting with paragraph 24 that just bulging pockets alone

12

is in the State of Utah no longer sufficient for what has

13

previously been used as a Terry frisk, and that is for reasonable

14

cause —

15

it has to be coupled with something else.

16

The critical aspect in LaFonze is they adopted a

or a reasonable suspicion search for weapons.

They said

The reason I focus the Court on paragraph 23 is because

17

in paragraph 23 the Court makes a real distinction that I believe

18

is factually significant, and that is in paragraph 23 they say

19

this is not a case where an officer does not know what might be

20

in the pocket.

21

In LaFonze, the officer actually observed soft objects

22

being taken and placed in the pocket.

So in LaFonze what they're

23

basically saying is there was no indication that there was a

24

violent crime, and there was also no indication of violence

25 I toward the officer there, but critically, there was no indication
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that there was a harmful hard object or a weapon in the pocket

2

because the officer observed them take the items that were soft

3

items and place them in their pocket.

4

indicated that that person had given a reasonable explanation for

5

what it was, that is they were leather workers, and therefore the

6

leather items that they put in their pocket was consistent with

7

that.

8

Furthermore, they

In this case that's where you draw the factual

9

distinction.

This is a case where the officer had no idea

10

what was in the pocket.

In fact, he did not know and did not

11

observe the defendant place anything in his pocket at all.

12

Also factually distinguishable from that is other

13

characteristics, including the defendant's demeanor, and

14

specifically the demeanor of some sort of protection over the

15

right-hand pocket, the officer describes specifically a stiff arm

16

directly over the pocket while the other arm was loose,

17

indicating some need to conceal what was in there.

18

Specifically, this particular defendant, when there were

19

obvious bulges, the officer asked him if he had anything in his

20

pocket —

21

anything in your pocket, and he —

22

him, "What's in your pocket," and he said, "Nothing."

not do you have a weapon or anything, but do you have
or he —

the officer asked
Two times

23 J he said nothing, when there clearly was something in his pocket.
24 I

So those factual distinctions the Court needs to make

25 I and make a determination based on the rule of law if in fact

-531

those distinctions, and the State argues that in fact they do

2

make a significant difference on what an officer is entitled to

3

do.

4

In addition, just as you walk through all of the

5

indicators, even if you take out the nervousness ones, because

6

that's one thing that LaFonze talks about, too, is it says you

7

strike nervousness —

8

about that a little bit.

9

observation of the officer, even though there's no lights or

general nervousness.

I want to talk to you

First we start with an intense

10

sirens going.

11

is positioned at an intersection where he's either going to enter

12

the intersection or cross the intersection.

13 I

Through the mirrors while the driver is sitted

That's distinct —

—

that's important, because the focus

14

is on the rearview mirrors, not on oncoming traffic, until, of

15

course, the officer notices —

or indicates him to pull over with

16

his hand, no lights or sirens.

So clearly you have someone who

17

is making distinct observation of the officer, an unusual amount

18

of that.

19

Then there was nervousness described as the intent on

20

watching, quick, sharp, jerky eyes and jerky movement, the

21

bloodshot eyes, and then the wide open eyes and the dilated

22

pupils were all initial observations that the officer made.

23

If you take out the quick, sharp, jerky movements and

24

even the wide open eyes, that still leaves you with the bloodshot

25

eyes and the dilated pupils.

Even if you accept the defendant's
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explanation that he was welding earlier that day which caused the

2

red bloodshot eyes, it does not explain the dilated pupils.

3

That's where the State is making the argument that if you have

4

dilated pupils at 11 o'clock in the morning coupled with these

5

other things that could be indicative of one or the other, you

6

have to make a reasonable inference of where that is going. I

7

think the Court can then take that inference and say there

8

may have been a portion of nervousness, but it can be added to

9

the totality of the circumstances based on the training and

10

experience of the officer knowing that in fact that is also

11

indicative of methamphetamine use or a stimulant use —

12

eyes, dilated pupils and the nervousness, and specifically the

13

quick, sharp and jerky movements.

bloodshot

14

You then move on with additional information.

15

from the vehicle. At that point you have body tremors and still

16

the quick movements, consistent not only with methamphetamine use

17

or —

18

the body tremors is with that.

19

He steps

it's consistent with methamphetamine use and particularly

The color draining from his face also consistent with

20

the use of drugs or narcotics, and the internal clock mechanism

21

was also off so much so that during the Romburg test the officer

22

indicated that he estimated 30 seconds in 10 seconds, which

23

indicates the very rapid Romburg or internal clock, which would

24

be consistent with his quick movements.

25

THE COURT: Mr. Thomas, held me validate my recollection
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on that.

Was the —

2

field sobriety tests or before?

3

MR. THOMAS:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. THOMAS:

was he told to empty his pockets after the

Before.
Before.
It was before.

But —

and the Romburg test

6

was actually not brought before the Court's attention until the

7

defendant testified that there were other things that occurred.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. THOMAS:

Okay.
I think the Romburg was —

the reason the

10

State is concerned about that is because if in fact his internal

11

clock was messed up, that's also consistent with whether or not

12

his memory is accurate versus the officer's.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. THOMAS:

Okay.
If you put all those together, what the

15

State's arguments and what I believe is you can add those in the

16

totality of the circumstances, even though some of it could be

17

attributed to nervousness, but it's also very consistent with

18

stimulant use.

19

That's where the officer went.

I think that it's admirable that this particular officer

20 1 as he continued to make conduct —

and this is where there's some

21

additional evidence I think the Court needs to really carefully

22

make a distinction between the LaFonze case, and that is the

23

officer asked —

24

focusing his investigations to whether or not there's substance

25

abuse, then he asked about the pockets and twice after the

after all these indicators, the officer is
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defendant saying, "There's nothing in my pockets," the officer

2

then takes the next step.

3

something in there."

4

got a level of suspicion, which is a very high level of suspicion

5

based on his training and experience.

6

He doesn't just say, "Clearly there's

He doesn't just reach in, even though he's

At that point he then notifies the defendant of his

7

Miranda rights.

8

step of saying, you know, "Look—" well, actually he had emptied

9

some things from his pockets at that point, but he still refused

10

In other words, the officer takes an additional

to empty something.

11 J

At that point he knew that —

he was really concerned

12

that he was hiding something specific, and the officer didn't say

13

he thought it was weapons, but he took the correct step.

14

didn't say, "Well, hey, it still might be a weapon so I'm going

15

for it," or anything like that.

16

know there's something being hidden there.

17

indicators of stimulant use, and you've still got something in

18

your pocket," and so he notified him of his rights.

19

He

He identified, "You know what, I
I've got all these

I think that's significant, a significant deviation

20

from the facts you have in LaFonze.

I think that in and of

21

itself goes to support what the officer did.

After that consent

22 J he said, "What have you got in your pockets now?"

That's when

23 I or pull that out, and that's when in fact he responded by his
24
25 I

actions by removing that.
So the State would argue that we have met our standard

—
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and the officer acted reasonably under the circumstances, and the

2

totality of the circumstances, and that it's factually

3

distinguishable from LaFonze.

4

MR. BEASLIN:

May I please the Court with reference to

5

Mr. Thomas, what we're really talking about here, your Honor, is

6

the totality of the circumstances under which the circumstances

7

arise due to the fact that he, Officer Isaacson, merely stopped

8

Mr. Hogue with absolutely no criminal act being participated in.

9

The truck was legal, he was legal.

He had not committed any act

10

of crime whatsoever.

11

purpose was to talk about David Sentie, and he did that, and he

12

told him where he had been.

13

He stopped and he asked him, and the

At that point in time there was no articutable suspicion

14

given at that time for him to go any further or do anything.

15

should have quit then.

16

stop should be reasonable, and after the purpose of the stop has

17

been performed, then he ought to just release him.

That's what I

18

asked him, "Why didn't you just release him then?''

Now he comes

19

up with all these great things, he said he observed this, he did

20

that and so forth.

21

He

Under Lopez, of course, it says that the

As indicated in LaFonze, I think it's simple.
LaFonze —

It says

22

here the question of nervousness, that —

they have

23

now rewritten that and published it now in 470, Utah (inaudible)

24

page 763.

25

behavior such as avoidance of eye contact is consistent with

It says, "We have previously held that because nervous
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innocence as well as criminal behavior.

2

afforded no weight in determining —

3

officer's reasonable suspicion of criminal activity."

4

Such contact can be

determining or detaining

I think that's what we have here.

The mere fact that

5

the eyes contact and so forth, that that doesn't necessarily mean

6

that Mr. Hogue had committed any crime or was about to commit a

7

crime or was any threat to Mr. Isaacson, your Honor.

8
9

Also with reference to the nervousness, the case further
goes on, "Absent LaFonze's nervous and evasive behavior, the

10

State's justification derived from Officer Salice's testimony

11

essentially boils down to these:

12

purses from the vehicle, her pockets were bulging and she wore

13

baggy layered clothing.

We conclude that these circumstances

14

taken together do not —

do not constitute specific and

15

articutable facts such that a reasonable prudent man would be

16

warranted in belief that his safety or that of others was in

17

danger."

18

LaFonze removed two small

Of course, the Terry case of course with reference to

19

the frisk is the same thing.

He testified that he did in fact

20

make a frisk —

21

Honor, they cite People vs. Liscomb, which is a New York Case,

22

579 NY2.d.

23

protective frisk, they were not entitled to require defendant to

24

empty his pockets."

25

cases have held that the pockets —

a Terry frisk on him.

In that same case, your

"Even assuming officers were entitled to conduct a

I think that the Courts have held and other
they do not —

are not
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entitled to have them reduced or to take out the things in their

2

pockets.

3

he had in his pocket when in fact no crime had been committed.

4

He didn't have a weapon.

5

in time.

6

soon as he made the initial question about Sentie.

7

talking about Sentie that's why he was there.

8

for any other reason, other to find out what happened to David so

9

that he could maybe take care of the burglary case that he had

That's what he did with him was to have him remove what

He hadn't done anything at that point

I think the facts are that he should have stopped as
Once he's

He wasn't there

10

been looking into that morning —

11

then he comes up with these other things, your Honor.

12

11 o'clock in the morning, and

The issue is really whether or not where do we stop it,

13

and I think under the Lopez that we stop it right there.

14

indicated in LaFonze, of course, the young lady —

15

remove the purse she put in the front pocket.

16

purse —

17

the car.

18

from the right pocket.

19

or threatening, and I think that we have the same fact situation

20

here.

21

Deputy Isaacson, as I've indicated in the memorandum that I V e

22

got there —

23

arrested and so forth.

24
25

she —

he placed the hood —

As

asked her to

He placed the

the purse on the hood of

He then instructed defendant to remove the other bag
The defendant's demeanor was not hostile

Mr. Hogue's attitude was not hostile or threatening to

that I gave to you, your Honor, and he was then

The Court held, "The investigating Officer Salice had no
reasonable suspicion to justify the frisk and the resulting
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search of her person."

That's what they reversed it on, if you

2

recall, in that case, your Honor.

3

I think we've got the same similar statutory—

4

THE COURT:

5

In that case, Mr. Beaslin —

LaFonze case?

6

MR. BEASLIN:

7

THE COURT:

8

read the case.

9

license plate light.

Yes.
I understand from your facts, and I haven't

The stop was made because of a speeding and a

10

MR. BEASLIN:

11

THE COURT:

12

is it the

Right.
Their focus at the —

on this appeal wasn't

regarding the driver, but a passenger.

13

MR. BEASLIN:

14

THE COURT:

That's right.
So was there any suspicion of any drug

15

use recognition or any alcohol or anything like that?

16

they —

17
18

why did they search her pockets?
MR. BEASLIN:

Well, they didn't need to, and that's what

the Court said.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. BEASLIN:

There's no basis to.
I know, and there's no basis here for

21

searching Mr. Hogue.

22

pulled up off the highway.

23

given David a ride that day and that was it.

24

he had to do anything more.

25

Why were

He hadn't done anything at the time when he
He stopped, told him that he had
I don't know that

It was Officer Isaacson then continued to, and the
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second point that I made in my memorandum was the questioning of

2

the defendant has no basis for further questioning.

3

Isaacson had no basis for asking extraneous questions, including

4

questions about knives and weapons.

5

Deputy

The law is well settled that once the stop is made the

6

detention must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to

7

effectuate the purpose of the stop, State vs. Lopez.

8

know, Lopez is kind of the guiding light with reference to for

9

search and seizure.

As you

I think that that's what he did wrong —

I

10

think that he kept going and asking him questions about it when

11

there was no reason to.

12

In LaFonze, of course, the passenger, as indicated the

13

case —

14

bulging pockets and so forth was really no indication, and they

15

gave —

16

bulging pockets they say —

17

any more suspicious than the bags themselves that they put into

18

that, and all of those items, your Honor, are listed in the

19

LaFonze case.

20

or as I just read a minute ago, that the fact that the

the Court gave no indication that that was the case.

The

they likely should not be reviewed as

Their conclusion was that given the inherent nature of

21

the crimes being investigated and that the absence of reasonable

22

suspicion suggesting the presence of weapons, that something

23

there was no occasion to frisk LaFonze, and there wasn't any

24

reason for frisking Mr. Hogue here, either.

25

held that the suppression —

—

Therefore, they've

and they reversed Judge Anderson
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down in the Seventh Circuit, your Honor —

2

Seventh District.

In any event, our position is that there is no basis or

3

no reason at all for Mr. —

4

what he did.

5

and I think that you should suppress the evidence that they have,

6

your Honor, in reference to what they found after they went into

7

the pockets and so forth of —

8

indicated in LaFonze.

9

Officer Isaacson to go further than

I think he went too far.

I think he went too far,

the bulge of the pockets as

LaFonze, now, your Honor, is —

the new one is in 470

10

Utah Advanced Reports 863, as I indicated.

I think that case is

11

clearly on and in line with our fact situation we have here, your

12

Honor.

13

far and he should have let him go after the initial stop and

14

after he did what he had to do at that point.

The rule is, I think, that Officer Isaacson just went too

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. THOMAS:

Thanks.

Anything further, Mr. Thomas?
Just real briefly.

I'd just like to

17

reiterate there are similarities between LaFonze, a factual basis

18

and this particular case, but I do believe that there are factual

19

distinctions.

20

The two key ones that I think are really important, I

—

21 I I believe that the State has met its burden when it comes to the
22 I expansion of the stop, and that is because the officer had a lot
23

of reasonable suspicion that he may have an impaired driver,

24

somebody on the road.

25 I

I think he's justified in going further.

Moving directly to the search or the request to remove

-631

items from the pocket, in LaFonze they also had some general

2

nervousness.

3

this one.

4

They had some other indicators that are similar to

In this one we have some other factual distinctions as

5

well, but two key ones that I think are really important for the

6

Court to focus on, the one in LaFonze the officer did observe

7

items going into the pocket.

8

vehicle pick up some items, place them between her legs, take

9

them out of the car with her and place them in her pocket, and

10

He observed the passenger of the

those were soft items.

11

The officer was saying at that point he thought that she

12

may have a weapon in her pocket because there was a bulging

13

pocket.

14

In paragraph 23 the Court says, "This is not a situation

15

where the officer did not know what was in their pocket."

16

think that's factually distinguishable.

17

had an officer who did not know what was in their pockets.

18

That gets you to the inquiry.

So I

Clearly in this case you

That gets you to the

19

inquiry of what's in your pockets or do you have anything in your

20

pocket, and the defendant then lied.

21

very distinct physical characteristic of the defendant attempting

22

to protect by that stiff arm over the right pocket.

23

clearly was a physical characteristic that's distinguishable from

24

what was going on in LaFonze.

25 I

In addition, you've got a

There

Very distinguishable there.

Finally, in this particular case the officer after
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narrowing down his search, when he felt like he needed to do

2

more, and after he finally getting whatever was in that pocket,

3

he gave a Miranda warning.

4

on, notified the defendant of specific rights under the

5

Constitution not to respond to his questioning.

6

consented to the questioning and responded by removing the items

7

from his pocket.

8

10

The defendant

I think those are distinguishable from LaFonze.

THE COURT:

9

So he specifically, before he went

Okay.

Well, let me make some observations.

I think that these suppression hearings, these search and seizure
cases are very interesting.

I've been on the bench long enough

1 1 I to hear many of these cases.

I can just say that applying the

12

standards and the guidelines that we're given from the higher

13

courts, it boils down to whether under a totality of the facts

14

all of the facts and circumstances the activities and the actions

15

of law enforcement folks are reasonable given the Constitutional

16

guidelines that we have.

17

—

I agree with Mr. Beaslin that State vs. Lopez says that

18

you make a stop, do what you have to do to initiate or conclude

19

the purpose of the stop, and at that point the defendant should

20

be free to go.

I don't think —

again, in this case, I think

21 J Mr. Thomas has by the officer's testimony gotten us past that.
22 I

I think the question I had was well, this was just a

23

stop, just a questioning.

24

over.

Deputy Isaacson motioned him to pull

They were going to stop and talk about Isaacson's question

25 I regarding Mr. Sentie.

I suppose based on him pointing his finger
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to pull over at that point, you know, you could argue he was

2

detained.

3

what would have happened if he hadn't.

4

discussed Sentie.

5

Officer Isaacson was pretty clear in recognizing some signals.

6

Probably —

I don't know, it's interesting to note
But anyway, he did.

They

Then from the evidence that was educed here,

Having recognized those signals he figured he had an

7

impaired driver, and I think he was justified in continuing the

8

purpose for a stop on that basis.

9

Setting aside the nervousness, setting aside the

10

bloodshot eyes, if you've got pupils that look like hoot owls at

11

11 o'clock in the morning, you've got some signals that there may

12

be some impairment.

13

Officer Isaacson testified he hadn't completed the drug

14

recognition certification, but that he's probably made a lot of

15

arrests for impaired drivers, and we deal with methamphetamine

16

use in the community, and it isn't hard to spot.

17

signs and things that are obvious to even people on the street

18

that are indicative that somebody is high on meth.

19

There are some

There -- Deputy Isaacson testified as to the basis for

20

his suspicions, his reasonable suspicions, and he wanted to go

21

further.

22

search, I guess as a result of Deputy Isaacson asking him what

23

was in his pockets, there was visibly something in his pocket.

24

He said it extended in a bulge and that he was concerned.

25

defendant answered nothing twice when asked if there was —

Then, as Mr. Thomas said, we get to the search.

The

The
what

-661 I was in his pockets.
2

They gave him Miranda.

He was asked to

empty his pockets, and out came the dope.

3

I think his actions are reasonable here, Mr. Beaslin.

4

I f m going to deny your motion to suppress.

5

complicated this case, and the thing that made it interesting is

6

why —

7

place.

8

those signals as to impairment, he was justified in continuing it

9

further, and that's what he did.

10

The thing that

that there was really no reason for the stop in the first
It was a voluntary stop.

I guess once having received

I suppose on this basis we ought to just set both of

11

these cases again for status, or if you want a trial date we can

12

give you a trial date.

13

MR. BEASLIN:

We'll set it for status, your Honor.

14

THE COURT:

15

COURT CLERK:

16

THE COURT:

17

(Hearing concluded)

Two weeks?
April 30th.
Okay.

Thank you.
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BENCH.
*1 Inventory searches are a well recognized
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. See State v. Hygh, 111 P.2d 264,
267-68 (Utah 1985) (citing South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092 (1976)). "
In order to support a finding that a valid inventory
search has taken place, the court must first
determine whether there was reasonable and proper
justification for the impoundment of the vehicle." Id.
at 268. The State must also show " 'that there
exists an established reasonable procedure for
safeguarding impounded vehicles and their contents
and that the challenged police activity was
essentially in conformance with that procedure.' "
Id. at 269 (quoting 2 Wayne H. LaFave, Search &
Seizure § 7.4 at 576-77 (1978)).
Defendant concedes that his vehicle was justifiably
impounded. He argues, however, that the trial court
erred in finding the inventory search valid because
the State failed to meet its burden to establish that a
© 2006 Thomson/West. No
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standardized procedure for inventory searches
existed and that the officer complied with the
procedure when conducting the search of
defendant's vehicle. Specifically, defendant argues
that the best evidence rule, Rule 1002 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence, requires the State to introduce
the actual written policy at the suppression hearing.
We disagree. The best evidence rule does not apply
because the determination as to the admissibility of
the gun was not made at trial, but rather was made
at a pretrial suppression hearing, where the rules of
evidence do not apply. See Utah R.Evid. 1101(b)(1)
and Utah R.Evid. 104(a). FN1
FN1. A defendant who wishes to make an
evidentiary challenge, such as a best
evidence objection under Rule 1002, must
proceed to trial and make the evidentiary
challenge there.
Even if the best evidence rule did apply, the State is
not bound to "submit written procedures in order to
carry its burden of showing that its agents acted in
accordance with standardized procedures when
performing an inventory search of an impounded
automobile." State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 989
(Utah Ct.App.1992). In Strickling, as in the instant
case, evidence regarding the procedures for
inventory searches came solely from the testimony
of the searching officer at a pretrial suppression
hearing. Id at 988. The testimony of the officer in
the instant case, like the testimony of the officer in
Strickling, was sufficient to establish the existence
of, and compliance with, standardized procedures.
Additionally, defendant's contention that the
inventory search was invalid because the officer
failed to complete it himself is without merit. The
fact that the first officer did not complete the search
himself is unimportant because the record reflects
that a second officer completed it.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in
finding the inventory search valid because it was
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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conducted as a pretext to an investigative motive.
We again disagree. The law allows an officer to
impound a vehicle "with registration that has been
expired for more than three months." Utah Code
Ann. § 41-la-1101(l)(f)(i) (1998). The officer in
this case testified that he routinely impounds when a
vehicle is well past the required time for
registration, as defendant's vehicle was in this case.
In Strickling, the court determined that the State
produced the necessary threshold evidence when the
impounding officer testified that he impounds sixty
to seventy-five percent of the vehicles he stops for
expired plate registrations. See Strickling, 844 P.2d
at 987. The court then stated that "[t]he
determinative evidence here is what the officer
actually did, without regard to his motives in a
particular case, when confronted with registration
violations." Id. The uncontroverted testimony of the
officer in the instant case is that he impounds
ninety-nine percent of the vehicles he stops when
plate registration expired nine months earlier.
Moreover, in addition to the long expired
registration, defendant could not provide proof of
insurance, further demonstrating that impoundment
was proper. Upon properly impounding the vehicle,
an inventory search was required.

evidence and defendant's resulting conviction.
GREENWOOD, A.P J., and DAVIS, J., concur.
Utah App., 1999.
State v. Clifford
Not Reported in P.3d, 1999 WL 33244693 (Utah
App.), 1999 UT App 112
END OF DOCUMENT

*2 The long expired registration and the defendant's
inability to provide proof of insurance, coupled with
the officer's
stated impoundment practices,
demonstrate that the officer properly conducted the
inventory search in accordance with established
policy and procedure. Therefore, even assuming the
continued viability of the pretext doctrine in
inventory search cases, there was no pretext in this
FN2

case.

z

FN2. Compare State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d at
268 (stating the inventory exception does
not apply when the inventory is merely a
pretext) with State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d
1127, 1138 (Utah 1994) (rejecting the
pretext doctrine in traffic stops).
We see no reason to disturb the trial court's
determination that the inventory search of
defendant's vehicle was valid. Accordingly, we
affirm the trial court's refusal to suppress the
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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